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Abstract:  We combine labor force survey data with trade and production data to examine the impact of 
trade on wages and employment in the Philippines’ manufacturing sector.  Our main findings are as 
follows.  First, in contrast to findings typically reported for Latin American countries, our data indicate 
that wage inequality in the Philippines’ manufacturing sector has declined over the period in which 
trade liberalization has been undertaken.  This is despite the fact that reductions in tariff rates were 
largest in less skill intensive manufacturing industries.  There has also been an absence of any secular 
rise in returns to higher education.  Second, tariff reductions have been associated with declines in 
industry wage premiums in capital-intensive industries.  Moreover, these declines appear to have been 
largest for skilled workers.  Finally, tariff reductions have had an insignificant effect on both 
employment as well as the average hours of work of full-time employees across industries.   These 
findings are consistent with a scenario where workers in capital-intensive industries, especially the 
more skilled ones, earned rents prior to trade liberalization; liberalization may have worked to erode 
these.  
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Over the last two decades scores of developing countries have moved to liberalize their trade regimes.  
How have these episodes of liberalization affected workers?   In view of the importance of this 
question for public policy there have been a number of recent papers that examine various dimensions 
of this issue.  Prominent examples include the work of Currie and Harrison (1997), Ravenga (1997), 
Hanson and Harrison (1999), Robbins and Gindling (1999), Feliciano (2001), and Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2001).  By and large, much of this work has been based on the experience of various Latin 
American countries with a few contributions considering cases from Africa.  Recent evidence from 
liberalizing Asian countries is much more limited.
1   This gap in the regional coverage of the existing 
literature is particularly glaring given Asia’s abundance of labor (in both absolute as well as relative 
terms).  In this paper we take some steps towards filling this gap by analyzing trade-labor linkages in 
the Philippines, a country which embarked on a program of trade liberalization since the mid-1980s 
and for which fairly good data are available.   
We focus on examining the impact of trade on relative industry wages and employment in the 
manufacturing sector over 1988 to 1997.  As in the work of Gaston and Trefler (1994) for the US and 
Feliciano (2001) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2001) mentioned above, we estimate industry wage 
premiums using labor force survey data.  These are subsequently related to measures of trade policy, 
trade flows, and industry characteristics.  Since the wage premiums are based on earnings functions 
that include controls for various observable worker characteristics including age, sex, and educational 
attainment, they represent the portion of wages that are purged of workers’ observable characteristics 
and accrue to workers’ industry of employment.  Working with industry wage premiums can therefore 
alleviate aggregation biases that may result from working with average industry or plant level wages.  
                                                 
1   Exceptions include the work of Suryahadi (1999 and 2003) for Indonesia and Kambhapati, Krishna, and Mitra (1997) for 
India.  The former examines the links between trade and premium to skills/education while the latter focus on the effects of 
liberalization on employment in five import competing industries.  
  2For example, suppose that import competing industries employ a larger share of skilled and thus higher 
paid workers as data for the Philippines indicate is the case.  Import competing industries would then 
have higher average wages.  Ignoring the composition of worker characteristics across industries may 
lead a researcher to take the positive correlation between imports and average wages as evidence that 
import competition is beneficial for wages (working through the effect of import competition on 
innovation and productivity, for instance). 
The panel nature of our estimated industry wage premiums and access to production data at the 
industry level allows us to address another potential complication in estimating the impact of trade on 
relative wages.  As Gaston and Trefler (1994) point out, policymakers may set trade policy with 
consideration to the composition of workers across industries (for example, average education, average 
age, average level of skills, etc.).  Since worker composition may also affect wage premiums – US data 
suggest that industries with larger shares of skilled workers tend to have higher wage premiums, 
something we find with Philippines data, too – ignoring the endogeneity of protection will lead OLS 
estimates of the impact of protection on wage premiums to be inconsistent. To alleviate endogeneity 
concerns we introduce industry characteristics and alternatively, industry fixed effects as controls in 
estimation.  The latter are particularly useful since our data on industry characteristics is quite limited.  
For example, information on unionization is not available by manufacturing sector industries.   If 
unionization varies across and industries and has important effects on how labor markets adjust to 
trade liberalization – as Gaston and Trefler (1995) find to be the case for the US – our analysis would 
miss out these effects.  To the extent that unionization and the structure of bargaining between workers 
and firms is slow to change, introducing industry fixed effects can be useful for alleviating omitted 
variable bias.   
  3We also examine other dimensions of trade-labor linkages.  Much of the recent work on trade 
and wages has focused on the effects of trade on economy-wide returns to education.  While an 
analysis of the role of trade in driving changes in returns to education is beyond the scope of this paper 
(Chu, Hasan, and Lee (work in progress) focus on this issue), our earnings function estimates shed 
light on the behavior of returns to education over the period of trade reform in the Philippines.  Finally, 
we use our industry level information on employment as well as average hours worked to assess how 
trade has impacted employment in terms of both employee counts as well as hours of work across 
manufacturing industries.      
  The remainder of our paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses some conceptual 
issues related to trade and labor market linkages and also provides a description of the trade policy 
framework in the Philippines.  Section 3 describes our data and presents summary statistics and trends 
pertaining to trade and relevant worker characteristics.  Section 4 describes our results and Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2.  Trade and Labor Linkages  
2.1 Conceptual Issues 
One of the most convenient starting points for thinking about trade and labor linkages is the 
Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model of trade.  In its simplest version, where trade takes place between two 
countries of the world endowed with two factors of production in different proportions, the model 
predicts that a reduction in trade barriers will raise the demand for and returns to the abundant factor in 
each of the two regions.  If the two factors are skilled and unskilled labor, trade liberalization in the 
unskilled abundant country should lead to a decrease in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled 
  4labor as the demand for unskilled workers increases.  The opposite should take place in the skill 
abundant country.    
The HO model’s assumption of perfect factor mobility implies that returns to factors are equal 
across sectors.  Since in reality factors may take considerable time to reallocate across sectors, the HO 
model is often thought to describe the long-run effects of trade.  For the short to medium run, a better 
guide to the labor market effects of trade may be provided by the specific factors model.  In Mayer 
(1974), for example, trade liberalization focused on one sector will depress wages in that sector if labor 
is immobile.  This happens as increased imports in the liberalized sector shift the industry demand for 
labor downward.  The inability of workers to move to other sectors breaks the link between their wages 
and those elsewhere.  As Goldberg and Pavcnik (2001) point out, the widely held belief that trade hurts 
workers is consistent with the specific factors model.  
Allowing for imperfections in product and factor markets introduces a far richer variety of 
possibilities than the general equilibrium HO and specific factors models allow, however.  If domestic 
firms have monopoly power, for example, trade liberalization may have a “pro-competitive effect” on 
workers as import competition makes the product demand curve more elastic and forces firms to 
reduce markups.  Under certain conditions, the reduction in markups will lead to an increase in the 
demand for labor, a proposition for which Kambhapati, Krishna, and Mitra (1997) present evidence 
using plant level data for five import-competing industries from India.  Firms may also react to import 
competition by investing in improvements in productivity.  The latter would raise the demand for 
labor, ceteris paribus.  Currie and Harrison (1997) find evidence that firms in some sectors in Morocco 
did respond to trade liberalization in this manner.  
How changes in labor demand impact workers depends also on the nature of competition in 
labor markets.  When they are competitive, industry elasticities of labor demand and supply determine 
  5the extent of movement in employment and wages.  On the other hand, labor market imperfections 
introduce yet another layer of complexity.  When workers have bargaining power, for example, it is 
quite likely that they will use this to share in the rents created by protection.  Trade liberalization may 
then be expected to hurt workers as rents overall decline.  But the actual responses will depend on 
specific circumstances.   Workers may choose to maintain employment and accept lower wages.  But 
the opposite may also take place as when lay-off rules benefit senior workers so that senior workers 
push for higher wages at the expense of unemployment of junior workers (Grossman 1984).  
As the foregoing discussion indicates, there are a number of factors that influence trade-labor 
linkages.  Empirical evidence is ultimately needed to determine which channels are, or at least appear 
to be, the more relevant ones.  
 
2.2  Trade liberalization in the Philippines
2  
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines pursued protectionist policies from the 
1950s to the 1970s.  Although there were some attempts at liberalizing trade in the 1960s and 1970s, it 
was only in the early 1980s that a serious effort at liberalization was initiated.  Two key aspects of the 
liberalization package were a Tariff Reform Program (TRP) that entailed compression of the tariff rate 
structure from a 0% to 100% range to a 10% to 50% range from 1981 to 1985 and an Import 
Liberalization Program (ILP) for lifting quantitative restrictions on imports.  The latter was abandoned, 
however, in 1983 due to a balance-of-payment crisis.  It was resumed once the Aquino government 
came to power in 1986 where it achieved far more success. While 34% of the total number of 
Philippines Standard Commodity Classification lines were regulated in 1985 – only two percentage 
points less than that in 1980, this was down to 12% by 1988 (Medalla, 1990).   
                                                 
2  A detailed discussion of trade policy reforms in the Philippines may be found in Manasan and Querubin (1997). 
  6In 1991 the government enacted a second tariff reform program (the so-called TRP II) whereby 
tariff rates would be further compressed to a 10% to 30% range.  However, there were a number of 
exceptions granted so that about 10% of commodity lines in 1995 were still subject to tariff rates 
below 10% or between 30% and 50%.  There was also a liberalization of quantitative restrictions in 
1992 for a variety of imported agricultural and manufacturing goods.  In a number of cases, the tariff 
rates on the liberalized goods were set fairly high with a built-in five-year phase down of these tariff 
rates.  The tariffication process saw some reversal, however, with the re-imposition of quantitative 
restrictions in 1993 on various items, largely concentrated among agricultural goods. The result was 
that while only 164 commodities were subject to quantitative restriction by the end of 1992, the 
number had increased to 257 by 1993.   
A third wave of trade reforms took place in the mid-1990s (TRP III).  Measures included a 
reduction of tariff rates on a variety of manufacturing items including capital equipment and 
machinery, textiles, garments, and chemical inputs among others.  There was also some reduction of 
tariffs on “non-sensitive” agricultural goods.  Overall, the TRP III was aimed at developing a 4-tier 
tariff schedule: 10% or 3% for raw materials and capital equipment depending on whether these were 
available locally or not; 20% for intermediate goods; and 30% for finished goods.  There was also a 
liberalization of all import restrictions as a result of the need to comply with WTO commitments; some 
products were however allowed to have tariff rates above the ceiling of 30%.
3 
The result of the various trade liberalization measures has made the Philippines a far more open 
economy, especially insofar as the manufacturing sector is concerned.   Calculations by Manasan and 
Querubin (1997) and Manasan and Pineda (1999) reveal that effective rates of protection were reduced 
overall by half (29.4% in 1990 versus 14.4% in 2000).  Even larger declines in protection took place in 
                                                 
3 Recent reform measures have declared the intension of reducing tariffs across all sectors to 5% by 2004, with the 
exception of sensitive agricultural commodities (e.g., rice corn, sugar, selected vegetables, poultry, livestock, and meat 
products, etc., World Bank 2000). 
  7manufacturing (31% in 1990 versus 14.5% in 2000).   Greater openness is also seen in expanding trade 
flows.  While total exports had grown at an annual average rate of 4% in the 1980s, they grew at about 
16% in 1990-98. The result of this export boom has been to double the Philippines’ export share in 
world markets from around 0.3% in 1985 to 0.6% in 1998.  Manufacturing has been the main 
contributor to this export boom (World Bank, 2000). 
 
3   Data and Trends 
Our analysis of trade-labor linkages makes use of three data sets: trade related data which 
allows us to quantify the patterns of protection and trade flows across industries; production data 
which allows us control for industry specific characteristics, namely the capital-labor ratio; and finally 
the Philippines Labor Force Survey (LFS) data which provides information on workers. 
Our trade related data consists of a measure of average tariff rates and trade flows (imports and 
exports) for roughly 28 three-digit ISIC manufacturing industries and comes from the Trade and 
Production database developed by Nicita and Olarreaga (2001).
4  The original source of the tariff data 
is the TRAINS database maintained by UNCTAD. Because tariffs are reported in terms of the six digit 
HS classification, Nicita and Olarreaga use a one-to-one concordance table to arrive at tariff rates in 
terms of the three-digit ISIC classification.
5 They report the tariff as MFN simple averages at the 3-
digit level of the ISIC.  Table 1 reports the average tariff rates for the available years.
6   The table 
                                                 
4   While average tariff rates are imperfect measures of protection, we are forced to rely on these because of the lack of 
availability of other measures, such as effective rates of protection, at sufficiently high levels of disaggregation. 
5 UNCTAD calculates the simple averages using as the denominator only the actual number of dutiable lines 
6  One drawback of our tariff data is that we are missing tariff rates for 1991 and 1997.  As noted below, our industry wage 
premiums are based on LFS data from 1988, 1991, 1994, and 1997.  Thus we need to obtain tariff rates for 1991 and 1997 
in some way.  Using the available tariff information from 1988 to 1998, we use simple interpolation to get tariff estimates 
for these two years.  Interpolation for 1991 should not entail much error.  As Table 1 shows, tariff rates between 1990 and 
1992 were fairly similar.  Moreover, the literature on trade policy in the Philippines does not give us any reason to believe 
that there was a spike in tariff rates between these years.  The situation for 1997 is a little different since tariffs had changed 
between 1995 and 1998 and interpolation may not capture the actual year-by-year changes well.  We derive comfort, 
however, from the fact that actual tariff rates declined between 1994 and 1997 for the more aggregated industry groups 
  8confirms two aspects of the trends in protection described in the previous sub-section: the broad based 
reduction in protection in manufacturing over the 1990s plus the tendency for tariff rates to increase 
just after the “tariffication” of quantitative restrictions in 1992.   
Interestingly, the data also indicate a tendency for protection to be higher in industries 
generally thought to be more labor intensive, a pattern which is similar to that found in a number of 
other developing countries (Harrison and Hanson, 1999).   Thus in 1988 tariff rates in industries such 
as electrical and non-electrical machinery, transportation equipment, and chemicals were often more 
than 20 percentage points lower than those in industries such as apparel and footwear.  Given this 
initial pattern of protection, the move to harmonize tariff rates at lower levels meant that previously 
protected labor intensive industries saw large declines in protection (Figure 1).  At the same time, 
while absolute differences in tariff rates across industries came down by 1998, the relative structure of 
protection appears not to have changed too much (Figure 2).
7   
We also use trade flow data to examine how imports and exports are related to industry wage 
premiums and employment.
8   Among other things, this allows us to indirectly assess the impact of 
non-tariff barriers since these are likely to impact trade volumes.  Table 2 describes three statistics 
based on our trade flow data by industry for the two end-points of the period under analysis: exports as 
a share of total exports, imports as a share of total imports, and finally net exports as a proportion of 
total industry trade, or the net trade ratio, ([Xi – Mi]/ [Xi + Mi]).
9   The pattern of net trade ratios tends 
to conform to expectations: industries generally considered to be labor intensive are the ones with 
relatively high values of net trade ratio (for example, apparel and footwear).  However, the comparison 
                                                                                                                                                                       
reported in Manasan and Querubin and that our tariff rates for 1994 (actual) and 1997 (interpolated) are qualitatively 
similar. 
7 Spearman correlations between tariff rates in 1988 and 1998 were as high as 0.91. 
8 The trade flow data reported by Nicita and Olareagga are based on the COMTRADE database. Because the COMTRADE 
data are presented in terms of the SITC rev. 2 classification, Nicita and Olarreaga use concordance filters developed by the 
OECD to convert them into ISIC classification. 
9  When a group of products is imported but not exported, the value of the net trade ratio is -1. On the other hand, when a 
group of products is exported but not imported, the net trade ratio is 1. 
  9of export and import shares over time also shows that there has been a remarkable expansion of trade 
in non-traditional exports.   Thus, while apparel – the industry with the highest net trade ratio – had a 
virtually unchanged export share in 1988 and 1997, electrical machinery – an industry with a negative 
net trade ratio -   has seen a larger than four fold increase in its export share over time so that by 1997 
almost half of all manufacturing exports were accounted for by this industry.
10     
The production related variables contained in Nicita and Olarreaaga (2001) are drawn from 
UNIDO’s International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics and include at the three digit ISIC level, total 
output, total employment, and gross fixed capital formation.  Data on output are used in conjunction 
with trade data to compute export and import ratios while the gross fixed capital series are used to 
construct measures of the capital stock in each industry.
 11  Dividing capital stocks by total employees 
gives us a measure of the capital-intensity of each industry, a variable we use in our analysis below. 
Our labor force survey (LFS) data cover four years: 1988, 1991, 1994, and 1997.  The LFS data 
provide demographic and work (“job” or “business”) related details including age, gender, highest 
grade achieved, salary/wages and net receipts from employment and hours worked.
12  The reference 
period of work related information is the quarter running from July 1 to September 30 and is available 
for a respondent’s “primary” job as well as a “secondary” job if applicable.   
For our analysis we restrict our attention to individuals who were 15 years or older, worked in 
the reference quarter, and whose primary job entailed wage or salaried work of at least 35 hours per 
week on average over the quarter.  We divide total wage and salary earnings on the primary job for the 
quarter by the total number of hours worked on the primary job in order to arrive at individual’s hourly 
                                                 
10   The rapid increase in these exports can be traced to an increase in investments by multi-national corporations in the 
sector, especially semi-conductors, and the rapid increase in world trade in this sector (World Bank, 2000). 
11   We first express the capital formation series in 1997 US dollars.  We then sum the current plus four previous year’s real 
investment expenditures to arrive at a measure of capital stock.  We allow for 10 percent depreciation in the capital stock 
each year.  
12 While the LFS is a quarterly survey, only the survey for the third quarter asks information on wages.  The sample size of 
these LFS surveys is quite large and can cover about 100,000 individuals per year. 
  10wage rate.
13, 
14  Deflating these hourly earnings by the national CPI gives us real wages in 1997 pesos.  
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the sample of these wage and salary workers.
15  Real wages in 
the sample have grown by around 1.2% per annum over the 9 year period covered.  The average age of 
workers has been around 33-34 year with around 61-62% being male.  The average years of education, 
which increased from 10.06 years in 1988 to 10.50 years in 1997, is fairly high by developing country 
standards.   The increase in years of education is reflected in a decrease in the percentage of workers 
with “only primary education or less” and an increase in the percentage of workers with a “high school 
degree” or more.  Around 17 to 19 percent of wage and salary workers in the sample belong to the 
manufacturing sector.   
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the manufacturing sample and the non-tradeables 
sample (construction, utilities, and services) separately.  It also presents some measures of dispersion 
for real wages.  Importantly, wage inequality, which tends to be lower in the manufacturing sector, has 
declined in the manufacturing sector in terms of a number of measures of dispersion.  Wage inequality 
has also declined in the nontradeable sector, but often only marginally.   Consider the difference 
between the 90
th percentile and 10
th percentile wages over the 1988 and 1997 period.  These decreased 
by 0.066 log wage points in the manufacturing sector while the corresponding figure in the non-
tradeables sector was a decline of 0.005.  In similar fashion, while the Gini coefficient on wages 
declined from 0.358 in 1988 to 0.321 in 1997 in the manufacturing sector, the corresponding figures 
for the nontradeables sector were a decline from 0.419 to 0.409.    
                                                 
13   It may be noted that only about 2.15% of the workers with a wage/salaried primary job also reported a wage/salaried 
secondary job.   For the “full time” workers we deal with, this is naturally much lower, less than 1%.  
14  An examination of the reported earnings and hours worked suggested the need for some data cleaning procedures.  We 
deleted observations which yielded hourly wage rates below one peso and above 500 pesos.  In addition, a small number of 
observations reported normal working hours per day in excess of 24 hours.  These observations were also deleted.  Finally, 
individuals reporting between 16 and 24 hours of work were recoded to 16 hours.  
15  The LFS data available to us did not include a consistently defined set of sample weights across years.  Thus we could 
not use sample weights in our analysis.  
  11What appears to be driving these results is the fact that wage growth was almost equally high at 
the low (10
th percentile) and high (90
th percentile) ends of the wage distribution in the non-tradeables 
sector.  In the manufacturing sector, however, they were almost twice as high in the low end of the 
wage distribution as compared to the high end.  These statistics reveal a pattern of wage adjustments 
over a period of liberalization that are very much at odds with those typically found for previous 
studies from Latin American countries.  For example, Feliciano (2001) reports increasing inequality in 
the tradeables sector in Mexico driven by rapid growth of the highest wage earners and declines in 
wage growth of the lowest wage earners. 
Next, we turn to examining the sample worker characteristics across industries within 
manufacturing by matching the industry-level trade data with workers’ industry of employment.  Table 
5 presents various summary statistics by level of protection in 1988.  Industries with the lowest tariff 
rates (33 percentile or less of the tariff distribution) on average paid the highest wages, had the highest 
share of educated workers but accounted for the lowest share of employment
16.  In contrast, sample 
industries with tariff rates in the highest 1/3
rd of the distribution on average paid the lowest wages, 
employed the largest share of females, and had the lowest share of workers with more than a high 
school education.   Thus, protection as captured by average tariff rates, tended to be lower for 
relatively skill intensive industries.  If trade liberalization was aimed at reducing both average tariff 
levels and the variance in tariff rates across industries, relatively less-skilled intensive industries would 
be subject to the largest declines in protection.   Columns 3-6 of Table 5 which present sample worker 
characteristics by the degree of reduction in average tariff rates between 1988 and 1997 shows that is 
this precisely what happened.  Thus, industries in the upper third of the tariff reduction distribution had 
                                                 
16 This is the case regardless of whether we define employment on the basis of the LFS surveys or use instead the figures on 
employment reported in the industrial production database.  
  12on average in 1988, the lowest wage rates and the lowest share of workers with more than a high 
school degree (and largest share of females). 
 
4.  Econometric Analysis 
The fact that relatively less-skill intensive industries faced large declines in tariffs suggests that all else 
being the same, trade liberalization should have affected less skilled workers more adversely than 
others.  Our econometric analysis below sheds light on whether this was the case.
17 
We examine the impact of trade liberalization on relative industry wages using a two-step 
procedure as in Gaston and Trefler (1994), Feliciano (2001), and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2001).  In the 




ijt jt ijt t ijt Ind X w ε γ β α + ∑ + ⋅ + = log          ( 1 )  
where  ,  and  i j t  index individuals, industry of employment, and time,   represents real hourly 
wages, and 
w
X  represents a vector of individual characteristics which include age, age squared, five 
education dummies, and dummies for male, marriage status, and household head.  Also included in  X  
are a dummy for whether a worker deems his/her job to be “permanent” (i.e., work that had lasted or 
expected to last for 1 year or longer) so as to capture some element of job informality and region 
dummies to control for region specific factors influencing wages, including variations in cost of living.   
Industry dummies (Ind) are included to capture industry wage premiums.  In order to facilitate 
interpretation in the subsequent analysis of industry wage premiums, we do not omit any industry in 
the estimation of equation 1.  The dummy variable “trap” is instead avoided by estimating equation 1 
                                                 
17  We drop three industries from our econometric analysis because they have less than ten observations in any of our four 
LFS years (miscellaneous petroleum products; non-ferrous metals; and professional and scientific equipment).  The 
estimated industry wage premiums for these industries could be more susceptible to biases on account of outliers. 
  13by imposing the constraint,  0 = t tγ θ , where  t θ  represents the vector of share of employment by 
industry and  t γ  represents the vector of coefficients on the industry dummies (or industry wage 
premiums).   The industry wage premiums so computed have the property that they now represent 
deviations from the average wage across all industries rather than the usual differential wage with 
respect to the omitted industry.   
In the second stage, the estimated industry wage premiums are pooled across years and 
combined with trade and industry data in order to estimate the impact of trade on wages: 
jt j t it jt jt jt e I Y Z T P + + + + + = − 1 1 1 1 1 1 φ δ κ η π γ .         ( 2 )  
jt P  represents trade policy and is captured by average tariff rates while T  represents measures of 
imports and exports (lagged in order to alleviate endogeneity concerns).  The latter are included, 
following Goldberg and Pavcnik (2001), in order to control for factors that may effect both wages and 
trade policy.  Since such factors may well effect trade flows, including measures of these as regressors 
presents a way to check the robustness of the estimated relationship between trade policy and industry 
wage premiums.    represents observable industry level characteristics such as the capital-labor ratio.   
Year dummies   capture macroeconomic shocks that may independently influence wage premiums 
and RHS variables such as tariff rates.  Industry dummies   are included to control for unobservable 
time-invariant industry specific characteristics and thereby explore the relationships in the “within” 
dimension.  In order to account for the fact that our dependent variable has been estimated, we estimate 





  When we want to estimate the impact of trade on employment across industries, we follow a 
similar approach and estimate the following employment equation: 
jt j t it jt jt jt I Y Z T P L ξ φ δ κ η π + + + + + = − 2 2 2 1 2 2 ) ln( ,        ( 3 )  
  14where   represents total employment as reported in the production database of Nicita and Olarreaga 
(2001).   Year dummies capture the effects of economy-wide demand and supply shifters while 
industry dummies control for unobservable industry characteristics as in equation 2 above.  To 
examine whether trade has affected average hours of work instead, we simply substitute total 
employment with average hours worked over the quarter obtained from LFS data. 
jt L
 
4.1  Earnings Function Estimates 
Table 6 describes the estimates of earnings functions (equation 1) for the four years for which 
we have LFS data.  As is typically found in studies of this type, age (our proxy for experience) enters 
positively while its square enters negatively; men earn more than women, although this effect tends to 
decline over time; heads of households and married individual earn more; and those in jobs expected to 
last a year or longer earn more.   
The estimated coefficients on the education dummies indicate substantial returns to college 
education.  This can be seen in terms of Figure 3, which plots the estimated percentage differential 
between a given level of education and the omitted educational category.
18  The vertical distance 
between any two adjacent levels of education also gives us a sense of the marginal value associated 
with the higher of the two levels of education.  For all but the highest level of education, these vary 
between around 0.10 to 0.25.  For the highest level of education, they are much larger (between 0.75 
and 0.95).  Admittedly, it is possible that unobservable worker characteristics such as natural ability or 
family background lead our estimates of returns to education to be biased.  Thus, for example, a 
finding of high returns to higher education may reflect the selection of high ability individuals into 
                                                 
c
18 The estimated coefficients on the education dummies are converted into the per entage differential in earnings relative to 
the reference group (those who have not even completed primary education) as:  [ ] 1 − vt b e  for the various education 
levels ν . 
  15college thereby overstating the true gains from higher education.  However, our interest is not so much 
in the returns to education themselves.  Instead it lies in how the returns to education have evolved 
over the period of Philippines’ reforms.   As long as economic reforms did not effect the selection 
criteria used by individuals in deciding on the level of desired educational attainment it is possible to 
get a sense of the true evolution of returns to education by comparing the wage differentials associated 
with the various levels of education over time. 
The estimated returns to the various levels of education do not show a clear trend over time.  
Returns to the highest level of education decline between 1988 and 1991, spike up in 1994 and then 
decline once again in 1997.  For all but the highest level of education, returns first increase mildly 
between 1988 and 1991 (1994 in the case of the second highest level of education); then they decline.    
The absence of a secular increase in returns to education is quite different from what is 
typically reported for Latin American countries.  While the latter studies find large increases in the 
returns to higher education over the periods in which trade liberalizations were undertaken, we see no 
trend towards this effect in our data. Indeed, focusing on the longer 1988 and 1997 comparison, we 
find that the returns to college education have declined relative to every other educational category.  Of 
course, without further analysis it is not possible to say that it was trade per se which led to this. 
Nevertheless, we highlight this finding because it is one that contrasts with patterns observed 
elsewhere. 
 
4.2 Industry Wage Premiums and Trade 
As noted above, the coefficients on the industry dummies obtained from equation 1 are our estimates 
of industry wage premiums.
19   The wage premiums are found to be generally low in apparel, footwear, 
                                                 
19 The correlations of these premiums across the four sample years are typically fairly high – between 0.81 and 0.84 – for 
1988, 1994, and 1997.  The correlation between premiums in 1991 and each of the other three years is lower – between 
  16food, leather and wood products – all labor-intensive industries.  They tend to be high in petroleum 
refining, industrial chemicals, electrical machinery, and transport equipment – all capital intensive 
industries.    This can formally be seen from Table 7 which presents simple correlations between 
estimated wage premiums and various industry level characteristics, including capital labor ratios and 
tariff rates, for 1988.  The correlation between wage premiums and the log of the capital by labor ratio 
is 0.80 or higher.
20  Similarly, industries with a higher share of skilled workers (i.e., with some college 
education or more) tend to have higher wage premiums.  These correlations are consistent with 
findings for other countries whereby capital/skill intensive industries have the highest wage premiums 
(see, for example, Dickens and Katz, 1987 for the US and Moll, 1993 for South Africa).    
As in the case of the US, wage premiums are inversely correlated with tariff rates so that trade 
protection is higher in lower wage industries (Gaston and Trefler, 1994 and 1995).  But unlike the US, 
greater export orientation in terms of higher export ratios and net trade ratios are associated with lower 
wage premiums (significantly so in some cases).  Thus as the analysis of Section 3 using industry level 
data alone indicated, protection seems to have been larger in industries which the Philippines would be 
thought to have a comparative advantage –i.e., in the less capital/skill intensive industries.  The 
positive correlation between employment levels and tariff rates (last row) may suggest why this was 
so.  Policymakers may have been trying to protect industries with the largest levels of employment. 
How did the removal of protection effect workers?   The estimates of equation 2, described in 
Table 8, shed light on this.  In a model without industry fixed effects or industry characteristics, the 
coefficient on tariffs is negative and statistically significant (column 1).  The estimated coefficient on 
tariffs implies that a one-percentage point decline in tariffs is associated with a 0.9 percentage point 
increase in the industry wage premium.  A 20 percentage point decline in tariffs – the difference 
                                                                                                                                                                       
0.38 and 0.55.  This is partly driven by a premium for petroleum refining which is relatively low in 1991 as compared to the 
other years.  Excluding this industry from the analysis did change results in any significant way, however. 
20 The correlations for other years are similar and not reported.  
  17between some of the highest and lowest tariff rates across industries – would then be associated with a 
18 percentage point gain in the industry wage premium.   
Adding regressors which relate to trade flows does not change the relationship between tariffs 
and industry wage premiums (columns 2 and 3). The estimated coefficients on the import and export 
terms, introduced with a one-period lag to alleviate endogeneity concerns, are consistent with the 
bivariate correlations so that more export-oriented industries tend to have lower wage premiums and 
vice versa (though only one of the estimated coefficients relating to the various import and export 
terms is significant at the 10 percent level).  
The negative relationship between tariffs and wage premiums should not be taken to indicate 
that trade liberalization will lead to higher wages.  After all tariff rates are not set randomly across 
industries and thus the estimates just presented are potentially biased.   Consider, for example, a 
situation where political economy considerations drive policymakers to consider industry 
characteristics in setting tariff rates.  Policymakers may aim to protect labor-intensive industries and/or 
industries with large levels of employment as noted above.  Since such industries also have low wage 
premiums, tariffs would enter the wage premium equation with a negative coefficient, but this 
coefficient would suffer from omitted variable bias.
21  There are two ways of dealing with this bias.  
We can either include the pertinent industry characteristics as regressors and/or we can include 
industry fixed effects in estimation if we are not confident that our included industry characteristics are 
capturing the key (time-invariant) factors that determine trade policy.  The latter strategy would be 
important if, for example, unionization of a sector – something we have no information on - is a slow 
                                                 
21 Interestingly, the negative effect of tariffs on wage premiums would have been larger – almost two times as large – had 
we estimated wage premiums based on a first stage regression of log wages on industry dummies alone.  Thus as pointed 
out by Gaston and Trefler, ignoring worker characteristics in an analysis of industrial wages and trade can exaggerate the 
relationship between trade and labor market outcomes because to some extent workers are sorted across industries on the 
basis of such observable characteristics as education, age, and occupation.  Since trade and trade policy are not uniform 
across industry, there is potential for some endogeneity between worker characteristics and trade.   
  18to change characteristic of industries and an important determinant of both wage premiums and trade 
policy.    
Introducing industry characteristics makes the coefficient on tariff rates smaller in absolute 
size; it also makes the coefficient statistically insignificant at the ten percent level.  This is shown in 
columns 4-6 where the log of the capital by labor ratio is included as an additional regressor.  The 
various trade related variables also lose whatever significance they had.  Switching to industry fixed 
effects has an even more dramatic effect (columns 7-9).  The coefficient on tariffs becomes positive in 
every specification so that a lowering of tariff rates is associated with a decline in wage premiums.  
But the effects have very small t-statistics.  Taken together, the estimates of columns 4-9 suggest that 
the estimates of columns 1-3 suffer from omitted variable bias and that trade liberalization has in fact 
had little impact on wage premiums across industries. 
It is fairly common to find that trade liberalization has had only modest effects on wages (see, 
for example, the survey by Harrison and Hanson, 1999).  The results above appear to be in line with 
these other studies.
 22  At the same time, however, reductions in protection may have more of an impact 
on wages of certain types of workers or industries even if their effects are limited on average.   
First,  trade liberalization may have affected wage premiums differently for various types of 
labor.  For example, trade liberalization may have altered production methods thereby affecting the 
relative demand for skilled and less skilled workers.  Indeed, results from trade-labor studies of Latin 
American countries have typically stressed the role of trade liberalization in raising the relative 
demand for skilled workers by introducing skill-intensive methods of production.  Alternatively, as 
Feliciano (2001) notes it is possible that the bargaining power of workers varies by skill level.  Thus in 
                                                 
22 Due to the unavailability of information on non-tariff barriers to trade we cannot assess their impact directly.  But in view 
of the fact that non-tariff barriers and changes therein may well be reflected in terms of imports and exports, the 
insensitivity of wage premiums to our various trade related variables suggests that trade liberalization in general did not 
impact wage premiums significantly. 
  19Table 9 we present the results of wage premium equations for two groups of workers, skilled workers 
(those with more than a high school degree) and less skilled workers (those with a high school degree 
at most).
23  Industry dummies are always included.   None of the estimates on tariff rates are significant 
in either equation.  If anything, the fact that all the tariff coefficients for the skilled workers’ equation 
are positive while those for less skilled are essentially zero or even slightly negative is suggestive of 
the possibility that trade liberalization in the Philippines, unlike that in Latin American countries, put 
some pressure on skilled workers wages. 
Second, the effects of trade liberalization on wage premiums may be influenced by broad 
industry characteristics such as capital intensity.  For example, it is likely workers are better 
organized/have greater bargaining power in capital-intensive industries.  Firms tends to be larger in 
capital intensive industries and workers are likely to be better organized in large firms.  Additionally, 
unionization is typically less effective the more competitive an industry.  Since barriers to entry are 
likely to be higher in capital intensive industries, especially in a developing country, these may be the 
ones with a more inelastic product demand curve and hence a more inelastic labor demand curve.  The 
latter enables unions to be more effective in winning wage increases without exacerbating employment 
losses, thereby encouraging union activity.  The reduction of trade protection may therefore adversely 
affect workers in capital intensive industries since these are the industries in which workers would 
have been able to enjoy a portion of protection related rents.
24   
To examine whether there is any evidence for workers in capital intensive industries to be 
affected adversely by declines in trade protection, we interact tariff rates with the log of the capital-
labor ratio in estimating the wage premium equations. Table 10 presents the results.  The interaction 
                                                 
23  The two sets of wage premiums are based on separate earnings functions. 
24   Although data on unionization by three (or even two) digit industry is unavailable, Dejillas’s (1994) study of trade union 
behavior in the Philippines and discussion of the membership profile of the FFW, one of the largest trade unions in the 
Philippines, suggests that workers in more capital-intensive industries may have been more organized in the 1980s.    
  20term is positive and significant at the 10 percent level in columns 1and 2 and marginally so in column 
3.  This indicates that in the more capital-intensive industries, trade liberalization did lead to declines 
in wage premiums.   At the 75
th percentile value of the capital by labor ratio (2.40), for example, a one-
percentage point decline in tariffs is associated with a 0.61 percentage point decline in the wage 
premium in terms of the estimates of column 2 (dγ /d tariffs = 100* [0.0022 + 0.0016 * 2.40] ).  The 
associated F-test is significant at the ten percent level.   Estimating wage premiums for skilled and less-
skilled workers separately and repeating the analysis reveals that the decline in wage premiums as a 
result of tariff reductions is stronger among skilled workers.  For example, evaluated at the 75
th 
percentile value of the capital by labor ratio, the marginal effect of tariffs on wage premiums is 0.0084 
(and significant at the ten percent level) in column 5 versus 0.0063 (and insignificant) in column 7.
25  
This suggests that skilled workers in capital intensive industries faced greater downward pressure on 
their wages as a result of trade liberalization.   
   
4.3  Employment and Trade 
We now turn to the relationship between employment and trade.  We examine this relationship by 
regressing employment by industry on tariff rates and various trade flow measures as in equation 3.     
Without the inclusion of industry effects, tariff reductions are found to be associated with reductions in 
employment.
26  However, since this result may be driven by the fact that tariff rates have been higher 
in industries with larger employment (see the relevant correlation in Table 7), we introduce industry 
effects to check on whether the relationship between tariffs and employment remains positive in the 
“within” direction.  Table 11 describes the results when both industry effects as well as an interaction 
                                                 
25 A similar pattern emerges when the capital by labor ratio is interacted by imports in levels.  Thus, higher imports put 
downward pressure on wage premiums, especially among the higher skilled. 
26  We do not report the results in order to conserve space. 
  21term between tariff rates and the capital-labor ratio are included in estimation.
27  Although the 
interaction term between tariff rates and the capital-labor ratio are negative and significant in columns 
1-3 (driven by the case of skilled workers as columns 4-6 reveal), the P-values relating to the marginal 
effect of tariffs indicate that in all cases tariff reductions are found to affect employment only weakly.  
Moreover, to the extent that there is a marginally significant relationship (columns 5 and 6), tariff 
reductions in relatively capital intensive industries are associated with slight increases in employment 
of skilled workers.
28 In addition, increases in imports, whether in terms of levels or as proportion of 
domestic output, are also associated with increases in the employment of skilled workers.  These  
findings therefore suggest that trade did not adversely affect employment. 
  It is possible that trade effected employment not so much in terms of employee counts but 
rather in terms of the amount of hours worked.  To examine this possibility we draw upon the LFS data 
and use average hours worked (for those working at least 35 hours a week on average over the 
reference quarter) in place of employee counts in equation 3.  Table 12 describes the results for 
specifications in which industry fixed effects and an interaction term between tariff rates and the 
capital-labor ratio are included in estimation.
29  The P-values relating to the marginal effect of tariffs 
indicate that tariff reductions had no significant impact on average hours worked.  This is true for all 
workers taken together (columns 1-3) as well as for skilled and less skilled workers considered 
separately (columns 4-6 and 7-9, respectively).
30, 
31  
                                                 
27  It may be noted that tariffs have an insignificant effect on employment (for all, skilled, and less skilled workers) in 
specifications without the interaction term between tariffs and the capital-labor ratio.  
28  The reported P-values are based on the 75
th percentile value of the capital-labor ratio. 
29 As with employment, tariffs have an insignificant effect on average hours worked (for all, skilled, and less skilled 
workers) in specifications without the interaction term between tariffs and the capital-labor ratio.  
30 For less skilled workers reductions, the interaction term between tariffs and the capital by labor ratio is negative and 
significant indicating that a reduction in tariffs put upward pressure on hours of work in capital intensive industries 
(columns 7 and 8).  As noted however the full effect of tariffs on hours worked (i.e., taking into account the direct tariff 
term as well as the interaction term) fails to be significant at conventional levels. 
  22      
5.  Concluding Remarks 
The analysis of this paper suggests that trade liberalization has had fairly modest effects on both 
relative industry wages as well as employment.  In particular, declines in average tariff rates and 
increases in imports have tended to leave industry wage premiums and employment unchanged.  
Nevertheless, not all groups of workers have been unaffected by liberalization.  Workers in capital-
intensive industries, especially skilled ones, saw their wages come under pressure from tariff 
reductions and increases in imports.  Less-skilled workers in particularly capital-intensive industries on 
the other hand appeared to have to work longer hours as a result of tariff reductions.  
The fact that less skilled workers more generally did not experience negative outcomes from 
tariff reductions is somewhat surprising because labor/less-skill intensive industries were the ones that 
started out with the highest tariff rates and where tariff reductions over the period under consideration 
tended to be the largest.  Less skilled workers would be expected to face the brunt of liberalization in 
terms of the predictions of either the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model (via lower relative prices of 
labor intensive goods due to tariff reductions) or the specific-factors model (via greater import 
competition in labor intensive industries).   
The fact that if anyone, it was the skilled workers in capital-intensive industries that were 
affected, suggests that influences other than ones emphasized by traditional trade models may have 
been at work.  For example, it is quite possible that reductions in tariffs of labor-intensive industries 
did not hurt workers in these industries because firms were able to raise their productivity more easily.  
After all, the initial gap between best and domestic would likely to be the least in labor-intensive 
industries. Alternatively, workers in capital-intensive industries may have been better organized – 
                                                                                                                                                                       
31 The estimates of Table 12 also indicate that increases in imports (exports) were associated with greater (less) hours 
worked for skilled workers.  The finding is not very robust however since import and export ratios – measures of trade 
which are less susceptible to endogeneity concerns -  display little meaningful association with hours worked. 
  23something for which there seems to be some (indirect) support.  Thus they may have been able to 
extract better wages from their employers; trade liberalization would have put pressure on this rent 
related component of wages.   
  Of course, it remains possible that the average tariff rates we use as our measure of trade policy 
is more imperfect than we suppose.  Although the relationship between (lagged) imports and relative 
wages and employment are in line with those of tariffs, one focus of future research should be on 
obtaining other measures of trade policy, including more direct measures of non-tariff barriers.  This 
way, the robustness of our results can be tested.  Future research should also consider obtaining data on 
union activities across industries.  Finally, an interesting feature of our earnings functions estimates is 
that of stable/declining returns to higher education.  While it represents another and more broad-based 
way that skilled workers were hurt during the period under consideration, it remains to be seen whether 
trade liberalization was a driving force.  
 
  24References 
Chu, T., Hasan, R., and Lee, S., (work in progress).  Trade and Wage Inequality: Evidence from the 
Philippines.  East-West Center, Honolulu, HI.  
Currie, J., Harrison, A., 1997. Sharing the costs: the impact of trade reform on capital and labor in 
Morocco. Journal of Labor Economics 15: 44-71. 
Dejillas, L.J., 1994.  Trade Union Behavior in the Philippines 1946-1990.  Ateneo de Manila 
University Press, Manila, Philippines. 
Dickens, W.T., Katz, L.F., 1987.  Inter-industry Wage Differences.  In: Lang, K, Leonard, J.S. (eds.), 
Unemployment and the Structure of Labor Markets, Basil Blackwell, New York: 48-89. 
Feliciano, Z.M., 2001.  Workers and Trade Liberalization: The Impact of Trade Reforms in Mexico on 
Wages and Employment.  Industrial and Labor Relations Review 55: 95-115. 
Gaston, N., Trefler, D., 1994.  Protection, Trade, and Wages: Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing.  
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 47: 574-593.  
Gaston, N., Trefler, D., 1995.  Union Wage Sensitivity to Trade and Protection: Theory and Evidence.  
Journal of International Economics 39: 1-25.  
Goldberg, P.K., Pavcnik, N.,  2001.  Trade Protection and Wages: Evidence from the Colombian Trade 
Reform.   NBER Working Paper 8575, Cambridge, MA. 
Grossman, G.M., 1984.  International Competition and the Unionized Sector.  Canadian Journal of 
Economics 17, 541-556. 
Harrison, A., Hanson, G., 1999.  Who Gains from Trade Reform?  Some Remaining Puzzles.  Journal 
of Development Economics 59: 125-154. 
  25Kambhapati, U., Krishna, P., and Mitra, D., 1997.  The Effect of Trade Policy Reforms on Labour 
Markets: Evidence from India.  Journal of International Trade and Economic Development 6: 
287-297. 
Manasan and Pineda, 1999.  Assessment of Philippine Tariff Reform: A 1998 Update. Philippine 
Institute for Development Studies, Manila, Philippines 
Manasan, R.G.,  Querubin, R.G., 1997.  Assessment of Tariff Reform in the 1990s.  Discussion Paper 
Series 97-10.  Philippine Institute for Development Studies, Manila, Philippines. 
Medalla, E.M., 1990.  An Assessment of Trade and Industrial Policy, 1986-1988.  PIDS Working 
paper 90-07.  Philippine Institute for Development Studies, Manila, Philippines.  
Moll, P.G., 1993.  Industry Wage Differentials and Efficiency Wages.  Journal of Development 
Economics 41: 213-246.  
Nicita, A.,  Olarreaga, M., 2001.  Trade and Production Database.  World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Robbins, D., Gindling, T.H., 1999.  Trade Liberalization and the Relative Wages for More-Skilled 
Workers in Costa Rica.  Review of Development Economics 3: 140-154. 
Suryahadi, A., 1999. Wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor in Indonesian 
manufacturing. Economics and Finance in Indonesia 47: 271-288. 
Suryahadi, A., 2003.  International Economic Integration and Labor Markets: The case of Indonesia.  
In Hasan, R., Mitra, D. (Eds.), The Impact of Trade on Labor: Issues, Perspectives, and 
Experiences from Developing Asia.  Elsevier, Amsterdam, Netherlands.     











































































Figure 3.  Percentage Differential  eturns to Education, 1988 - 1997  R
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Table 1. Average Tariff Rates in the Philippines, 1988-1998 
    Year  
Industry  1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1998 
Food  Products  35.74 35.56 25.52 25.54    32.35    30.34 28.37 17.64 
Beverages  47.14 47.14 29.05 29.05    43.81    42.14 40.48 17.90 
Tobacco 43.33  45.00  27.50 27.50    42.50   42.50  42.50 15.75 
Textiles  38.68 38.68 26.07 26.07    29.32    29.29 26.79 14.60 
Apparel  49.73 49.73 29.88 29.88    49.16    48.91 30.51 24.34 
Leather  Products  33.30 33.30 23.26 23.26    32.32    32.21 30.72 12.66 
Footwear  47.00 47.00 30.00 30.00    48.00    48.00 48.00 25.00 
Wood  Products  37.21 37.21 24.89 24.89    27.98    27.77 27.55 15.72 
Furniture  50.00 50.00 29.13 29.13    40.00    34.57 29.13 22.96 
Paper and products   32.31  32.39  19.75  19.76   22.73   21.41  19.21  10.73 
Printing and Publishing   27.41  27.41  20.00  20.00   22.04   21.02  20.00  14.43 
Industrial  Chemicals  15.35 15.39 11.73 11.71    11.39    11.36 11.34  4.07   
Other  Chemicals  23.75 23.70 16.19 16.22    17.96    17.81 17.46  6.64   
Petroleum Refineries  15.87  15.87  11.88  11.88   7.78   7.74   7.74   3.00  
Miscellaneous Petroleum and Coal Products  20.00  20.00  19.13  19.13   17.88   17.88  17.88  7.25  
Rubber  Products  29.05 29.15 22.93 22.93    24.23    23.77 23.32 10.43 
Plastic  Products  41.75 41.75 27.06 27.06    33.66    31.52 29.41 15.68 
Pottery  China  Earthenware  40.71 40.71 26.43 26.43    36.07    34.82 33.57 16.21 
Glass and products  34.94  35.27  21.20  21.20   25.92   22.94  20.93  11.50 
Other Non-metallic Mineral Products  33.69  33.69 23.42 23.42    29.60    26.91 27.03 13.13 
Iron  and  Steel  16.29 16.23 14.34 14.34    15.53    15.00 14.88  8.09   
Non-ferrous  Metals  20.63 20.66 16.21 16.21    12.92    12.72 15.29  4.48   
Metal  Products  31.05 31.01 24.77 24.79    27.18    25.86 25.07 14.01 
Non-Electrical  Machinery  21.65 21.64 12.97 12.97    13.32    12.97 12.56  4.99   
Electrical  Machinery  29.81 29.81 19.27 19.31    20.06    18.97 17.93  9.15   
Transport  Equipment  24.59 24.83 17.68 17.63    17.58    17.22 15.30 12.16 
Professional and Scientific Equipment  20.03  20.03  17.09  17.09   16.94   16.90  16.86  7.03  
Other Manufactured Products  37.83  38.06  25.59  25.59   30.09   27.41  25.83  12.24 
Source:  Nicita  &  Olareagga  (2001)          
  
Table 2.  Net Trade and Export and Import Shares 
Industry 1988  1997 









Food  0.25   0.25   0.10   -0.09   0.06   0.05  
Beverage  -0.76   0.00   0.01   -0.76   0.00   0.00  
Tobacco -0.55    0.01   0.01   -0.63   0.00   0.00  
Textiles  -0.25   0.06   0.07   -0.27   0.03   0.04  
Apparel  0.97   0.07   0.00   0.93   0.08   0.00  
Leather  0.20   0.01   0.00   0.30   0.01   0.00  
Footwear  0.82   0.01   0.00   0.51   0.01   0.00  
Wood Products  0.98   0.12   0.00   0.17   0.01   0.01  
Furniture  0.98   0.03   0.00   0.65   0.01   0.00  
Paper and Products  -0.76   0.01   0.03   -0.69   0.00   0.01  
Printing and Publishing  -0.94   0.00   0.01   -0.87   0.00   0.00  
Industrial Chemicals  -0.62   0.06   0.18   -0.79   0.01   0.07  
Other Chemicals  -0.77   0.01   0.05   -0.74   0.01   0.03  
Petroleum Refineries  -0.04   0.03   0.02   -0.33   0.01   0.01  
Miscellaneous Petroleum and Coal Products  -0.48   0.00   0.00   -0.95   0.00   0.00  
Rubber Products  -0.74   0.00   0.01   -0.72   0.00   0.01  
Plastic Products  0.41   0.02   0.01   -0.36   0.01   0.01  
Pottery China Earthenware  0.75   0.00   0.00   0.28   0.00   0.00  
Glass and Products  -0.39   0.00   0.01   -0.62   0.00   0.01  
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products  -0.67   0.00   0.01   -0.90   0.00   0.01  
Iron and Steel  -0.78   0.02   0.09   -0.93   0.00   0.04  
Non-Ferrous Metals  0.40   0.08   0.02   -0.01   0.02   0.01  
Metal Products  -0.51   0.01   0.03   -0.53   0.01   0.03  
Non-Electrical Machinery  -0.88   0.01   0.12   -0.15   0.18   0.17  
Electrical Machinery  -0.01   0.16   0.12   -0.04   0.47   0.36  
Transport Equipment  -0.91   0.00   0.07   -0.66   0.02   0.08  
Professional and Scientific Equipment  -0.81   0.00   0.01   -0.27   0.02   0.02  
Other Manufactured Products  0.43   0.02   0.01   0.28   0.01   0.01  
 
 Table 3.  Summary Statistics: Full-Time Workers 
Variable  1988 1991 1994 1997 
      
Average Hourly Wages, 
1997 Pesos  18.83 20.55 20.98 23.98 
(Standard  Deviation)  (20.20) (19.98) (21.02) (20.91) 
      
Male (%)  62   61   61   62  
      
Average  Age  33.19 33.64 33.95 34.25 
(Standard  Deviation)  (11.75) (11.83) (11.96) (11.91) 
      
Average Years of Education  10.06   10.20   10.28   10.50  
(Standard  Deviation)  (4.19) (4.16) (4.04) (4.01) 
      
Education  Distribution:  (%)      
Below Primary Education  11.33   10.18   9.40   8.84  
Primary Graduate  17.48   16.99   15.64   14.09  
Some High School  10.99   11.36   11.07   11.06  
High School Graduate  23.17   23.32   25.71   25.05  
Some College  13.55   13.79   14.83   16.19  
College Graduate  23.48   24.35   23.34   24.76  
      
Married (%)  57   58   56   59  
      
Employment by sector (%)         
Agriculture   11.12   9.72   9.06   7.00  
Mining   1.07   0.80   0.57   0.79  
Manufacture  17.54   19.34   18.92   16.80  
Utility  1.16   0.97   0.97   1.17  
Construction  7.13   8.43   8.46   10.69  
Government  10.78   11.39   11.13   12.29  
Services   51.20   49.35   50.90   51.27  
      
Observations  14,647   18,826   19,005   29,611   
Table 4.  Worker Characteristics by Industry Type 
   Non-Tradeables  Manufacturing 
Worker Characteristic  1988  1991  1994  1997  1988  1991  1994  1997 
Average hourly wages  19.54  21.26  21.73  25.14  19.92  22.57  22.68  23.36 
(Standard  Deviation)  (21.22)  (19.91) (22.27) (21.66) (19.28) (22.97)  (19.41) (19.06) 
                    
Average Age  33.59  34.08  34.43  34.84  31.32  32.05  31.79  31.31 
(Standard  Deviation)  (11.83)  (11.96) (12.07) (12.08) (10.45) (10.76)  (10.87) (10.39) 
                    
Male (%)  57   57   58   60   63   60   61   61  
                    
Average Years of Education  10.77  10.87  10.84  10.99  9.59  9.81  10.05  9.97 
(Standard Deviation)  (4.14)  (4.15)  (4.04)  (4.01)  (3.50)  (3.41)  (3.31)  (3.18) 
                    
Education (% of Workers in each 
sector)                  
Below Primary Education  7.87   7.38   7.10   7.16   8.10   6.78   5.59   5.63  
Primary Graduate  15.17   14.87   14.09  12.79  19.31   17.47   14.88   13.89  
Some High School  10.32   10.91   10.71  10.66  12.96   11.84   11.38   11.50  
High School Graduate  22.77   21.64   24.09  22.70  31.34   34.99   37.11   39.75  
Some College  14.44   14.67   15.46  17.00  15.34   15.52   17.27   17.10  
College Graduate  29.44   30.52   28.55  29.70  12.96   13.40   13.77   12.14  
                    
Dispersion of real wages                  
Standard deviation of log wages  0.89   0.89   0.84   0.87   0.67   0.66   0.64   0.62  
Gini coefficient            0.42   0.40   0.41   0.41   0.36   0.32   0.33   0.32  
10th Percentile  3.44  3.79  4.5  4.92  6.53  7.84  8.15  8.65 
90th Percentile  34.16  37.21  36.52  48.3  32.93  33.49  35.5  37.5 
                   












Table 5.  Worker Characteristics in 1988 by Tariffs and Tariff Reductions  
    Rank of Tariff in 1988  Rank of Tariff Reduction: 1997-1988 
Worker Characteristic  Lowest  Middle Highest  Lowest  Middle  Highest 
Average hourly wages,  
in 1997 Pesos  27.33  19.39  17.63  26.98  20  17.56 
(Standard Deviation)  (24.35)  (17.64)  (17.78)  (26.71)  (19.97)  (14.91) 
            
Male (%)  70   79   47   80   73   49  
            
Average age  31.66  31.88  30.76  32.91  31.78  30.47 
(Standard Deviation)  (9.56)  (11.02)  (10.28)  (10.07)  (10.88)  (10.15) 
            
Average Years of Education  11.48  9.19  9.22  11.02  9.25  9.41 
(Standard Deviation)  (3.28)  (3.61)  (3.27)  (3.54)  (3.62)  (3.28) 
            
Education Level(%)             
Below Primary Education  2.66  10.64   8.07   4.93   10.73   7.01  
Primary Graduate  7.51  21.81   21.61   10.68   20.85   20.87  
Some High School  8.47  15.38   12.70   9.32   15.18   12.35  
High School Graduate  29.78  27.19   35.16   27.95   26.82   36.06  
Some College  26.88  12.43   13.46   24.66   13.87   13.52  
College Graduate  24.7  12.54   9.00   22.47   12.55   10.18  
            










 Table 6.  Estimates of Earnings Function  
(Dependent Variable=log(real hourly wage)) 
Dependent  
Variable 1988  1991  1994  1997 
Age 0.035***  0.016***  0.023***  0.035*** 
 (5.66)  (3.16)  (5.13)  (8.06) 
Age  Square  -4.0E-04*** -1.2E-04** -2.0E-04***  -4.0E-04*** 
 (5.05)  (1.97)  (3.52)  (6.90) 
Primary Graduate  0.120***  0.218***  0.163***  0.089*** 
 (2.71)  (5.48)  (3.85)  (2.52) 
Some High School  0.261***  0.335***  0.278***  0.225*** 
 (5.43)  (7.86)  (6.29)  (6.18) 
High School Graduate  0.370***  0.441***  0.409***  0.343*** 
 (8.49)  (11.50)  (10.26)  (10.51) 
Some College  0.491***  0.520***  0.532***  0.468*** 
  (10.22) (12.41) (12.51)  (13.31) 
College Graduate  0.903***  0.859***  0.922***  0.831*** 
  (18.15) (19.75) (20.75)  (22.22) 
Male 0.165***  0.096***  0.054***  0.062*** 
 (5.81)  (4.16)  (2.50)  (3.38) 
Head of Household  0.181***  0.181***  0.123***  0.168*** 
 (5.61)  (6.90)  (4.73)  (8.09) 
Married 0.050*  0.030    0.085***  0.053*** 
 (1.74)  (1.30)  (3.72)  (2.84) 
Permanent Job  0.193***  0.208***  0.144***  0.088*** 
 (5.90)  (7.45)  (5.69)  (4.33) 
Constant 1.445***  1.937***  1.884***  1.908*** 
  (12.65) (20.61) (21.36)  (23.85) 
R-Square  0.40 0.39 0.40  0.38 
Observations 2551  3629  3565  4903 




Table 7.  Correlation Matrix for Selected Variables, 1988 
   
Wage  







Wage premium  1               
                
                
Log K/L   0.840   1             
 0.000                 
                
Skill/Less Skilled  0.567   0.671   1           
  0.003   0.000              
                
Tariff Rate  -0.498   -0.694   -0.685   1         
  0.011   0.000   0.000            
                
Net Trade  -0.261   -0.466   -0.620   0.618   1       
  0.208   0.019   0.001   0.001          
                
Export Ratio  -0.360   -0.511   -0.634   0.380   0.772   1     
  0.077   0.009   0.001   0.061   0.000        
                
Import Ratio  -0.091   0.016   0.203   -0.450   -0.361   -0.029   1   
  0.665   0.940   0.330   0.024   0.077   0.893      
                
Log Employment  -0.334   -0.312   -0.364   0.350   0.179   0.055   -0.082   1  









Table 8.   Relative Wages and Trade Protection I 
 (Dependent Variable=Estimated Industry Wage Differentials) 
Independent Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 




 (5.51)  (1.97)  (3.59)  (1.42)  (1.43)  (0.80)  (0.04)  (0.24)  (0.27) 
                  
Log Lagged Real Import     0.016       -0.006       0.003    
   (1.50)      (0.63)      (0.21)   
                  
Log Lagged Real Export     -0.019*      -0.006       0.015    
   (1.73)      (0.56)      (0.85)   
                  
Lagged Import Ratio      0.020       0.013       -0.023 
     (1.04)      (0.92)      (0.68) 
                  
Lagged Export Ratio      -0.025       0.033       0.027  
     (0.67)      (1.05)      (1.14) 
                  
Log K/L        0.048** 0.053*** 0.061***       
       (2.40)  (2.81)  (3.16)       
                  
Industry Dummies  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                  
R-Square  0.293   0.339   0.303   0.388   0.404   0.415   0.823   0.825   0.825  
                  
Observations 100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Note:  All regressions include year dummies. Absolute, robust t-statistics in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 





Table 9.  Relative Wages and Trade  Protection II 
(Dependent Variable=Estimated Industry Wage Differentials) 
        Skilled Workers  Less Skilled Workers 
Independent Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Tariff Rate   0.003   0.003   0.004   -0.001   0.000
 A   0.000
A  
   (0.86)  (0.95)  (0.98)  (0.26)  (0.06)  (0.01) 
              
Log Lagged Real Import     -0.023       0.012    
    (1.16)     (0.61)  
              
Log Lagged Real Export     0.041*       0.004    
    (1.88)     (0.20)  
              
Lagged Import Ratio       -0.029       -0.032  
       (0.56)     (0.82) 
              
Lagged Export Ratio      0.046*       0.024  
       (1.90)     (0.73) 
              
R-Square  0.705   0.719   0.711   0.796   0.798   0.798  
             
Observations 100  100  100  100  100  100 
Note:  All regressions include year and industry dummies. Absolute, robust t-statistics in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 







 Table 10.  Relative Wages and Trade Protection with Interaction Effects  
(Dependent Variable=Estimated Industry Wage Differentials) 
 
  All Workers  Skilled Workers  Less Skilled Workers 
  1  2  3  4 5 6  7  8  9 
Tariff  Rate  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.005 0.005 0.005  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (1.09) (1.20)  (1.25) (1.38)  (1.60)  (1.52)  (0.73) (0.71) (0.82) 
               
Tariff Rate* 
Log K/L 
0.002*  0.002*  0.002  0.002 0.002 0.001  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (1.78) (1.73)  (1.61) (1.30)  (1.60)  (1.19)  (1.58) (1.57) (1.39) 
               
Log  K/L  0.026  0.029  0.033  0.054 0.035 0.060  -0.007  -0.005  -0.001 
  (0.77) (0.77)  (0.92) (0.89)  (0.53)  (0.98)  (0.17) (0.12) (0.03) 
               
Log Lagged Real 
Import  
 -0.004      -0.031     -0.000  
   (0.28)      (1.29)     (0.01)  
               
Log Lagged Real 
Export  
 0.018     0.045**    0.004  
   (1.15)      (2.03)     (0.21)  
               
Lagged Import 
Ratio 
   -0.005      -0.014     -0.008 
     (0.17)      (0.28)     (0.20) 
               
Lagged Export 
Ratio 
   0.024      0.041*     0.016 
     (1.09)      (1.68)     (0.49) 
               
P value of F Test  0.11  0.10*  0.10*  0.13  0.07*  0.12  0.19  0.19  0.20 
               
R-squared  0.84 0.84  0.84 0.72  0.74  0.73  0.81 0.81 0.81 
               
Observations  100 100  100 100  100  100  100 100 100 
Note:  All regressions include year and industry dummies. Absolute, robust t-statistics in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  F test pertains to the null hypothesis that the marginal effect of tariff rates is zero.  The 
marginal effect is evaluated at the 75







 Table 11.  Employment and Trade Protection  
(Dependent Variable=log(Employment)) 
 
  All  Workers  Skilled Workers  Less Skilled Workers 
  1 2 3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Tariff  Rate  0.009 0.013 0.006  -0.005  0.002  -0.009  0.020  0.022  0.018 
  (0.87) (1.16) (0.64)  (0.37)  (0.16)  (0.71)  (1.36)  (1.50)  (1.23) 




-0.008*** -0.011***  -0.008**  -0.008* -0.012** -0.007*  -0.006  -0.008  -0.006 
  (2.76) (3.10) (2.65)  (1.90)  (2.65)  (1.69)  (1.19)  (1.24)  (1.13) 
                 
Log  K/L  0.268** 0.287** 0.257** 0.292*  0.340**  0.277* 0.230  0.231  0.221 
  (2.19) (2.39) (2.01)  (1.85)  (2.16)  (1.68)  (1.31)  (1.24)  (1.24) 
                 
Log Lagged 
Real Import  
 0.127     0.239**      0.053   
   (1.31)     (2.02)      (0.46)   
                 
Log Lagged 
Real Export  
 0.137     0.102      0.164   
   (1.23)     (1.03)      (1.19)   




   0.196      0.363*      0.108 
     (1.28)      (1.72)      (0.72) 




   -0.127      -0.147      -0.126 
     (1.19)      (0.96)      (1.09) 
                 
P value of 
F Test 
0.45 0.36 0.41  0.20  0.12  0.16  0.86  0.90  0.88 
                 
R-squared  0.94 0.95 0.95  0.91  0.92  0.92  0.93  0.93  0.93 
                 
Observatio-
ns 
100 100 100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Note:  All regressions include year and industry dummies. Absolute, robust t-statistics in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  F test pertains to the null hypothesis that the marginal effect of tariff rates is zero.  The 
marginal effect is evaluated at the 75
th percentile value of the capital –labor ratio. 
Table 12.  Effects of Protection on Working Hours, All Workers 
(Dependent Variable=log(Average Hours Worked Per Quarter)) 
 
  All  Workers  Skilled Workers  Less Skilled Workers 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 




  (0.07) (0.00) (0.15) (0.63) (0.36) (0.63) (0.31) (0.35) (0.18) 









A  -0.001* -0.001*  -0.001 
  (1.22) (1.20) (1.12) (0.06) (0.30) (0.08) (1.81) (1.75) (1.67) 
           
Log  K/L  0.011 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.019 0.019 0.018 
  (0.88) (0.93) (0.82) (0.79) (1.06) (0.74) (1.18) (1.15) (1.10) 
           
Log Lagged 
Real Import  
 0.003     0.011*     0.002  
   (0.37)    (1.79)    (0.27)  
           
Log Lagged 
Real Export 
 -0.005     -0.010*     0.001  
   (1.15)    (1.96)    (0.10)  
           
Lagged 
Import Ratio 
   0.005     -0.000     0.010 
     (0.41)     (0.02)     (0.89) 
           
Lagged 
Export Ratio 
   -0.008     -0.009     -0.006 
     (1.02)     (0.85)     (0.67) 
           
P value of F 
Test 
0.35 0.36 0.35 0.67 0.64 0.67 0.23 0.23 0.22 
           
R-squared 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.37 0.41 0.38 0.55 0.55 0.55 
           
Observations  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note:  All regressions include year and industry dummies. Absolute, robust t-statistics in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  F test pertains to the null hypothesis that the marginal effect of tariff rates is zero.  The 
marginal effect is evaluated at the 75th percentile value of the capital–labor ratio. 
A Absolute value of the estimated parameter is zero 
to the third decimal place.  